T he knowledge of corporate social responsibility (CSR 1 ) was advanced during the past 50 years within the business and society (B&S) research tradition. The process of knowledge generation became accelerated thanks to a growing number of peer-reviewed journals (Paul, 2004) , conferences, and the growing interest of companies in the concepts we advocate. Despite these developments, some are concerned with the idealistic orientation of our field. Jones (1996) describes social responsibility as an "ideology." Management guru Michael Porter criticizes the idealistic orientation of our field in an interview with Mette Morsing: 1 My major criticism is that the field of corporate social responsibility has become a religion filled with priests, in which there is no need for evidence or theory.
an accurate description of reality, that is, the context in which organizations operate. By contrast, the normative approach is "value loaded" and explicitly states what companies should do (Rodriguez, Richart, & Sanchez, 2002) . It requires an opinion or advice on how companies should organize their operations. The instrumental approach presents a statement of relationships and requires the generation of hypotheses to predict certain causality. The latter approach is concerned with the way organizations can achieve their goals (Rodriguez et al., 2002) .
We use Donaldson and Preston's (1995) typology to analyze the descriptive accuracy, the normative validity, 5 and the instrumental power of the central thesis of B&S themes.
6 This analysis will provide insights on the extent to which this branch in the literature is idealistic. In fact, its level of idealism (i.e., advocacy of perfect but unrealistic business standards) will be indicated by the promotion of an ideal norm for business conduct that has no instrumental relevance and does not provide a comprehensive description of business reality. It should be mentioned here that the purity of distinction between descriptive, normative, and instrumental will forever remain imperfect (Freeman, 1999; Werhane, 1994) . It would be incorrect to describe any concept as exclusively descriptive, that is, value free, because it inevitably reflects the values of the researcher. Neither can it be exclusively normative, because any concept is a reflection of reality. Exclusively instrumental is impossible because the hypothesis of certain causality requires a good (descriptive) knowledge of reality and the values of the researcher to "see" that particular relationship. Nevertheless, the impurity of distinction between instrumental, normative, and descriptive serves perfectly our evaluation of the extent to which B&S literature is idealistic. Idealism is treated as a variable with anchors ranging from very much to not at all, where the former anchor is reached if a theme has strong normative orientation and incomprehensive (but existing) instrumental and descriptive ones; the latter anchor is reached when all three advancements in a theme are irrefutable.
Related Concepts in the CSP Construct
The CSP construct embraces the different aspects in the meaning of a "socially responsible" business. Three interrelated concepts are embedded in this construct concerned with the way organizations operate in their environments. CSR 2 (actions) is a reflection of CSR 1 (principles) when dealing with social issues (problems) (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Swanson, 1995; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991) . As each of these concepts is characterized by its specific complexity, we analyze their central theses separately according to Donaldson and Preston's (1995) typology to explore their level of idealism.
CSR 1
The concept CSR 1 has a philosophical orientation (Wartick & Cochran, 1985) . CSR 1 refers to corporate performance that is normatively correct with respect to all constituents of the firm (Epstein, 1987) . Such normative correctness implies a correspondence between corporate action and societal expectations (Zanisek, 1979) . According to Carroll (1979 Carroll ( , 1991 , social expectations can be translated into four characteristics of corporate social responsibility: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary. Companies are thus expected to generate profit, to obey the law, to operate in harmony with the unwritten social rules, and to voluntarily support societal programs even if society does not expect such support. This view on the responsibility of businesses confronts profit-driven corporate performance with its positive and the negative duties 7 to contribute to a better world. Organizations are thus regarded in the CSR 1 tradition not only as drivers of economic progress but also as moral actors.
Attributing morality to organizations requires that corporate decisionmaking processes are based on responsibility principles (Swanson, 1995; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991) . According to the relevant literature, those principles should guide companies to promote "social good" and to prevent "social harm" (Fitch, 1976; Jones, George, & Hill, 2000; Wells, 1998) . The responsibility principles lead companies to consider a triple- (Elkington, 1997) or a multiple-bottom-line (Waddock, 2000) approach to decision making instead of considering (exclusively) the economic bottom line. Hence, it is reasonable to note that CSR 1 advocates the development of organizational norms when institutionalizing the organizational objective of contributing to a better world. These norms need to be integrated in the organization, adopted as a reference for decision making, and shared by the organizational members. This view on integrating CSR 1 principles in business models is an acknowledgement of the dual description of organizations that either deems firms to be social actors themselves or considers them an aggregation of social actors (groups or individuals).
Although the company as a legal entity is meant to distinguish the organization from the personality of those who compose it (Wells, 1998) (i.e., the firm as a social actor), the normative correctness of corporate performance is inevitably associated with the morality of its managers and employees (i.e., the firm as an aggregation of social actors). Therefore, managers and employees, as the agents of a company, should take organization-related decisions from the perspective of their individual CSR 1 principles (Wood, 1991) . Personal values and ethics determine the individual principles of CSR 1 and shape the organization-related decision making of corporate agents (Swanson, 1995) . However, organizations are more than a sum of their employees (Collins & Porras, 1994 . They are distinct entities that share specific principles of responsibility. Moreover, the organizational principle of CSR 1 is helpful to unify the differences in individual responsibility interpretations. In other words, organizational CSR 1 principles attempt to accomplish congruency among the various individual CSR 1 principles (of its management and employees). This congruence is essential to ensuring the credibility of claims on the social responsibility of the company.
In sum, the central thesis of CSR 1 is predominantly prescriptive. In the words of Windsor (2001) , "Responsibility must have a normative basis" (p. 228). CSR 1 is critical to the self-interested, profit-driven view of the firm. Moreover, not only are organizations expected to obey the law, but proponents of corporate social responsibility believe that companies must contribute to social prosperity. Social prosperity is no longer seen in terms of economic welfare, but in the CSR 1 tradition, it incorporates social aims, ecological goals, notions of morality, and personal values. However, it would be too ambitious to claim that corporate actions have always corresponded to values and personal ideology (Zanisek, 1979) or that managers have always reasoned in terms of morality (Carroll & Meeks, 1999) . The moral view on organizations fails to explain the contribution of self-interested but innovative companies to the social prosperity of the EU and the United States. From this we can conclude that CSR 1 is very much idealistic. This tradition prescribes a perfect standard for business conduct, but it does not provide fundamental insights on the business logic of CSR 1 and on the challenges or risks of its implementation. Carroll (1979) describes social issues as "the topical areas" of CSR 1 . This branch in the literature is dominated by the life-cycle approaches (Lamertz, Martens, & Heugens, 2003) , which explain the evolution of a social issue from its emergence to its saturation phase (e.g., Bigelow, Fahey, & Mahon, 1993; Mahon & Waddock, 1992; Zyglidopoulos, 2003) . A widely accepted definition in the life-cycle tradition describes social issues as social problems that may exist objectively but become "issues" requiring managerial attention when they are defined as being problematic to society or an institution within society by a group of actors or stakeholders capable of influencing either governmental action or company policy. (Mahon & Waddock, 1992, p. 20; italics added) A critical reader will note that social issues are defined as problems and not as opportunities and that much importance is attached to the ability of stakeholders to put these problems on the agenda of policy makers or businesses. Hence, companies are well advised to analyze, evaluate, and eventually manage these social issues (Wartick & Cochran, 1985) . Talking about the solution of social issues, we refer to the definition of public issues, described by Buchholz (1988) as those "that involve multiple stakeholders with competing interests and involve some form of collective action" (as cited in Bigelow et al., 1993, p. 18) . Recently, Lamertz et al. (2003) have adopted a symbolic interactionist perspective on social issues, stressing that social actors give meaning to social issues existing in the organizational environment. This perspective defines social issues as socially constructed disruptions of an institutional order that structures purposeful exchanges between actors. (Lamertz et al., 2003, p. 82) This implies that social issues have enough impact to make enacted structures fail, and such disorder constitutes the interaction between social actors searching to resolve the problem of institutional disorder. This means that issues are subjects of interpretation, as they derive from the stakeholders' perceptions on particular social developments. It also means that the solution of social issues requires a collaboration of all parties associated with the issue. This second implication refers to the inappropriateness of stressing corporate responsibility to the natural environment, for example, without stressing the responsibilities of others, such as governments, consumers, and scientists (Dentchev & Heene, 2004) . Social issues are problems at the social level (not necessarily at the organizational level) that can only be solved through the collective action of groups with competing interests.
Social Issues
The central thesis in the social issues concept is of a descriptive nature, as it is concerned with social problems that receive much attention. In essence, there is not much idealism in the conception of social issues, as they require managerial attention only when they are pinned on the (political or corporate) agenda. Managerial consideration of and corporate contribution to social issues with such importance make, in our view, perfect sense for businesses. However, many believe that organizations have significant impact to resolve these problematic-for-society issues (Starik & Marcus, 2000) , and that brings a thin idealistic shadow over this concept. In reality, companies rather help to resolve social issues. It is unlikely that organizations would try to solve social issues unless these issues are perceived to directly influence the corporate operations (i.e., corporate issues) as opportunities and threats (i.e., strategic issues) or if their solution requires an insignificant effort. Here we shortly discuss the meaning of corporate and strategic issues. Wartick and Mahon (1994) In this definition, issues that have impact on the organization are conceptualized as discrepancies of expectations between the firm and its stakeholder(s). Corporate issues are thus a necessary extension of the identification and management of social issues. However, both social and corporate issues have a connotation of problems, which clearly limits the scope of corporate management.
Corporate management regards the internal and external environments in terms of "opportunities" and "threats." As the conception of social issues clearly neglects the opportunities of social development for businesses, it is necessary to consider the importance of strategic issues to managers. According to Ansoff (1980) , "A strategic issue is a forthcoming development, either inside, or outside the organization, which is likely to have an important impact on the ability of the enterprise to meet its objectives." Ansoff argues that an issue "may be a welcome issue, an external opportunity or internal strength" or it can be "unwelcome external threat, or an internal weakness" (p. 133). Overall, the diversity in issues (social, public, corporate, and strategic) represents the spectrum of matters that managers consider in their internal and external environments.
CSR 2
Although CSR 2 has been considered in the early years of theoretical development as an alternative to CSR 1 (Carroll, 1979) , these two concepts are not substitutable. Ackerman (1973) discovered that the organizational response to social demands might involve major difficulties and was among the first to focus on CSR 2 (Frederick, 1994) . In contrast to the moral considerations in CSR 1 , CSR 2 is concerned with the "ability [of organizations] to manage the company's relations with various social groups" (Frederick, 1994, p. 156) .
CSR 2 has a process orientation (Epstein, 1987; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991 ) that refers to the measures a company takes to resolve problems, for which it is deemed accountable. According to Fitch (1976) , a company can apply a utilitarian approach by doing nothing, or it can apply a humanitarian approach by doing much, such as preventing the mere occurrence of social problems. Based on the same scale (do nothing-do much), Carroll (1979) proposed four responsiveness strategies: reaction, defense, accommodation, and proaction. A good explanation of these CSR 2 strategies is provided in Clarkson (1995, p. 109) , where reactive responsiveness is described as doing less than required and as a denial of responsibility. Defensive responsiveness means doing the least required, where organizations do admit responsibility but tend to fight it. By contrast, an accommodative strategy of responsiveness constitutes doing all that is required as organizations accept the responsibility. And in the case of proactive responsiveness, companies tend to anticipate the claims others will make, that is, doing more than is required.
The motivation for a prompt response to social issues appears quite pragmatic in the CSR 2 tradition. This pragmatism of social responsiveness consists of the proposition that "unless social issues can be processed with reasonable speed, they may pile up and ultimately put the company in a position where it cannot function effectively in its traditional role as a producer of goods and services" (Ackerman, 1973, p. 95) . In this vein, Clarkson (1995) gives substance to the term responsiveness, arguing that companies need to distribute the wealth and value created by the corporation among their primary stakeholders, 8 without favoring one of them at the expense of the other. Otherwise, Clarkson notes, "the firm's survival will be threatened" (p. 112).
We can conclude that CSR 2 advocates, at its core, an instrumental approach to social issues and corporate constituents. CSR 2 translates, in managerial language, the philosophically oriented rhetoric on the moral obligations of business to address and resolve issues spanning beyond the boundaries of the organization. Responding to issues other than those of strategic importance is motivated by an improved organizational performance. As such, CSR 2 is not idealistic but, rather, provides a business rationale for corporate responsiveness to social issues. However, this rationale is not fully supported by empirical research. Although the majority of studies on the link between social and financial performance report a positive link, some find a neutral and inconclusive/mixed, even negative, relationship (Margolis & Walsh, 2001 . Therefore prominent scholars conclude that this relationship must be regarded as inconclusive, complex, and nuanced (e.g., Arlow & Gannon, 1982; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; McWillams & Siegel, 2000; Roman, Hayibor & Agle, 1999) .
CSP
The CSP construct embodies a principle-problem-action framework in its attempt to enrich the profit orientation of management with a broader attention to stakeholders and issues. CSP is associated with concrete outcomes of corporate conduct: "the social impacts of corporate behavior; . . . the programs companies use to implement responsibility and/or responsiveness; and the policies developed by companies to handle social issues and stakeholder interests." (Wood, 1991, p. 708) From the above, we can conclude that CSP embraces instrumental and normative notions, where the latter seems to prevail. This might appear counterintuitive because only one (viz., CSR 2 ) of the three founding concepts is normative. CSR 2 contains predominantly instrumental notions, and the conception of social issues is of a descriptive nature. However, one explanation for the predominant normative orientation of the construct is its initial aim to challenge the exclusively profit-driven organizational performance with (positive and negative) duties to social prosperity. The CSP tradition criticizes organizations, which maximize their profit and do not consider any other consequences of their actions. As a result, the necessity of CSP frameworks was largely illustrated by industrial accidents, management misconduct, and corporate scandals. Besides, responsibility literature rarely acknowledges that organizations have positive influences on society. The normative orientation of CSP is thus a logical result of criticizing companies for the negative developments in societies and the natural environment. Looking at companies from such a negativist perspective is disputable and emphasizes the idealism of CSP.
Moreover, the descriptive (issues) and the instrumental (responsiveness) orientations of CSP appear underdeveloped and vague. The dynamic nature of issues (Carroll, 1979; Hoffman, 1999; Waddock & Boyle, 1995) undermines their exact description. Similar dynamics are observed with respect to the mode of responsiveness. Actually, if a specific corporate action is considered responsible now, it might not be considered as normatively correct in the future (Zanisek, 1979, p. 360) . The instrumental value of CSR 2 is not in the differentiation between four strategies but, rather, in the advice on when and how to adopt every one of them. However, this knowledge remains underdeveloped in our field. As a consequence, the CSP construct appears fairly idealistic. It sets a perfect norm for business conduct with respect to the solution of issues that spans beyond the impact of companies without providing rigorous advice on the conditions under which CSP can (or cannot) contribute to the competitiveness of firms (e.g., Rowley & Berman, 2000) .
Alternatives to (a Dimension of) CSP
In the research on CSR 1 , the attention of scholars became in the 1990s diverted "significantly to alternative themes such as stakeholder theory, business ethics, CSP and corporate citizenship" (Carroll, 1999, p. 292) . Apart from these alternative themes, sustainable development (Brundtland, 1987) and corporate sustainability (e.g., Sharma, 2002; Sharma & Starik, 2004; Starik & Marcus, 2000; Starik & Rands, 1995) advocate economic welfare, social equality, and environmental preservation with respect to current and future generations. As we have dedicated substantial attention to the CSP construct and its founding concepts in the preceding pages, the subsequent pages will focus on business ethics, corporate citizenship, stakeholder management, sustainable development, and corporate sustainability.
Business Ethics
Business ethics is rooted in the earliest history of mankind, because commercial practices (perhaps in various forms) have always existed (Mcmahon, 1997) . Business ethics has been developed as a branch of general ethics and is concerned with the moral adequacy of business action (Goodpaster, 1997) . Fundamental to business ethics are general ethical principles, such as honesty, keeping promises, helping others, and respecting the rights of others (Post, Lawrence, & Weber, 2002) .
Moral adequacy in business ethics refers to two levels of analysis: individual and corporate (Werhane & Freeman, 1999) . At the organizational level, moral adequacy of business actions is evaluated with reference to four general principles (Goodpaster, 1997) : (a) virtues, or a value system that takes decisions incorporating the principles prudence, justice, temperance, and courage; (b) duties, or obligations to fidelity in relationships and loyalty to the community; (c) rights, or respecting basic freedoms and equalities; (d) interest, or the morality of self-interest, group interest, or greatest (God or number) interest. These principles are established at the corporate level and denote the ethical norms that an organization should consider in its performance.
The question arises here of what constitutes a moral act of managers and employees, who in fact will or will not materialize the corporate principles of business ethics. Werhane and Freeman (1999) summarize the most important indications that justify the moral adequacy of organizational agents' acts. First, role morality suggests that "the well-being of any organization depends on the fulfillment of role obligations by its constituents" (p. 4). Yet this is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, and in illustration Werhane and Freeman give the example of the deeds of Nazi Germany: Nazi soldiers acted immorally, although they acted in fulfillment of their roles. Second, shared morality classifies acts of individuals as morally adequate if those are in the interest of the organizational agents (i.e., the commons). Again, the caveat to the previous example applies here. Third, Werhane and Freeman explain the morality of corporate agents using the integrated social contract theory of Dunfee (1994, 1999) , where humans (and thus also corporate agents) are part of communities that have their own moral "free space" and thus generate their own behavioral norms, that is, hypernorms. And finally, a fourth way to evaluate moral adequacy of corporate agents are the so-called moral minimums (organizational, cultural, or ethnic norms) that attempt to make the abstraction of the hypernorm notion more tangible. Common for these four indications of employees' and managers' moralities is that they evaluate individual actions within the context of a specific organization.
Business ethics, equally as CSR 1 , consists of moral principles, ethical notions, and value-driven rules. In addition, individual morality in the tradition of business ethics represents a fair description of reality. From this, and consistent with previous discussions in the literature (e.g. , we can conclude that business ethics involves normative and descriptive notions. As such, there is some proportion of idealism in business ethics, because it proclaims ideal standards for both individual and corporate actions without even questioning if and how these influence the competitiveness of companies. Because of their philosophical and normative orientation, we can argue that business ethics and CSR 1 cover the same level of analysis. Besides, they both consider the dual conception of organizations (social actor vs. aggregation of social actors). However, some authors distinguish these concepts. Ferrell, Fraedrich, and Ferrell (2002) explain the difference by arguing that social responsibility is a social obligation or contract with society, whereas business ethics are carefully thought-out rules of business organizational conduct that guide decision making.
Corporate Citizenship
The term corporate citizenship is used as a metaphor and underlines the membership of corporations in society (Waddock, 2002, p. 4) . As multinationals operate in more than one country, global corporate citizenship denotes the organizational duties to these various societies. The emphasis in this strand in the literature falls on building bridges between companies and the communities in which they operate . In other words, corporate citizenship illustrates that companies are embedded in their host societies.
The metaphor of corporate citizenship requires nothing less than "good" corporate conduct. There are four general characteristics of good corporate citizens. First, they are simultaneously profitable, obey the law, engage in ethical behavior, and make restitution through philanthropy (Carroll, 1998) . Second, good corporate citizens build stakeholder relationships through mutually beneficial practices (Waddock, 2002; Waddock & Smith, 2000) . Third, they respond to society's expectations (Carroll, 1991) . And finally, good corporate citizens carefully consider the influence of a company's actions on the community . Overall, good corporate citizens operate in a model of collaboration that proves mutually beneficial for all parties.
Corporate citizenship is a synonym of CSP (Dawkins, 2002, p. 272) . Both are concerned with the effects of corporate performance on society and advocate the contribution of companies to social prosperity. Similarity can be found in the level of analysis and the scope of corporate citizenship and CSP. However, they clearly have different content. Corporate citizenship does not explicitly represent a composite of responsibility, issues, and responsiveness, as is the case with CSP. Corporate citizenship merely implies, yet fails to make explicit, the distinction between normative principles, description of problems, and instrumental actions. Corporate citizenship is used as a metaphor and appears as rhetoric on good corporate performance. It is, according to us, certainly not a good description of reality, as there are also bad citizens and bad corporate practices. The attention of corporate citizenship is explicitly directed toward the positive social effects of corporate actions, where good corporate citizens, as a rule, have to opt for harmony with social norms and expectations. Although there is no explicit instrumental orientation in corporate citizenship, according to Husted and Allen (2000) , it "might have positive consequences for the financial performance of the firm" (p. 24). We therefore classify corporate citizenship as being predominantly normative and, to a certain extent, instrumental. This conception of corporate conduct appears to us fairly idealistic because of its prescriptive orientation, the implicit and underdeveloped instrumental logic, and its metaphorical vocabulary.
Stakeholder Management
The term stakeholder, similar to corporate citizenship, has much metaphorical value, as it is aimed at diverting attention (both managerial and scientific) from the term stockholder or from the general (at that time) neoclassical attention to profit maximization. The stakeholder perspective conceptualized the firm as an aggregation of groups or individuals who affect or are affected by the firm's activities (Freeman, 1984) . The stakeholder view of the firm correctly describes organizations as an aggregation of groups (or individuals) with specific interests. Considering these interests as legitimate (Phillips, 2003) and with intrinsic value is a valid normative assumption in stakeholder theory (Werhane & Freeman, 1999) . Moreover, without stakeholder support and stakeholder efforts, an organization cannot contribute to the value chain (Freeman & Liedtka, 1997) , and as a result, the achievement of its objectives will remain unrealized. Because organizational performance is dependent on collaboration between stakeholders, managers need to adopt a holistic analysis of the determinants of stakeholder action, that is, stakeholder interests and stakeholder identity (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) .
In effect, stakeholder management means value distribution to the corporate constituents (Clarkson, 1995) . Distributing value to stakeholders denotes the ways the firm influences the utility function of its constituents so as to incorporate pecuniary transactions (e.g., payments of dividends, corporate taxes, above-average wages, and fringe benefits) or nonpecuniary transactions (e.g., ensuring quality, sharing knowledge, and making credible commitments) (Dentchev & Heene, 2004) . Given the scarcity of organizational wealth, the process of value distribution requires a development of priorities. Two classifications of stakeholders provide a useful framework for prioritizing when developing management strategies for value distribution. One focuses on the resource relationships of a firm with its constituents, assessing the relative power and dependency of stakeholders to that firm (Frooman, 1999) . The other classification departs from a stakeholder claim and analyzes the characteristics of that claim. In this context, stakeholders differ in their salience to the firm by a combination of the attributes' "power, legitimacy, and urgency" (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) . The distribution of organizational wealth is instrumental, that is, aims at improving corporate performance if that wealth is directed to silent stakeholders or stakeholders on which the firm is resource dependent. Value distributed to secondary stakeholders is in general a discretionary act unless its purpose is to minimize the uncertainty of stakeholder dynamics (when secondary stakeholders become primary and vice versa) or to bridge information deficiencies (Dentchev, 2004) .
We can agree that the stakeholder view of the firm has contributed with many instrumental propositions and that it has the potential to become a powerful instrumental theory (Jones, 1995) , but such an instrumental theory cannot yet count on robust empirical support, as Donaldson and Preston acknowledge:
It should come as no surprise that stakeholder theory cannot be fully justified by instrumental considerations. The empirical evidence is inadequate, and the analytical arguments, although of considerable substance, ultimately rest on more than purely instrumental grounds. (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 81) The breadth of stakeholder theory (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003) and its complexity are a potential explanation for the lack of empirical support to the instrumental power of stakeholders. In his early work, Freeman (1984) presented the interaction between the corporation and its stakeholders from a dyadic perspective, where the firm is the hub of a wheel and the stakeholders are situated at the end of the spokes (cf. Frooman, 1999, p. 191) . This dyadic perspective on stakeholder interactions is a too narrow presentation of reality and hence requires revision. The stakeholder perspective on organizations is better represented as network interactions (Rowley, 1997) : Corporate constituents are no longer seen in a single relationship (stakeholder-organization) but in multiple relationships across the stakeholder space (stakeholderstakeholder, stakeholder-organization). This network perspective implies a complex view on stakeholder relationships, which suggests a model of multiple moderating and mediating relationships.
Despite the underdeveloped instrumental orientation in stakeholder management, there is not much of idealism in this branch of the literature. This conclusion is drawn on the underlying managerial logic in stakeholder theory based on its irrefutable descriptive accuracy and normative validity (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) . Compared to the preceding conceptions in B&S, stakeholder management and CSP have much in common (Harrison & Freeman, 1999) . 9 Freeman and Liedtka (1991) have even suggested an abandonment of the responsibility concept in favor of "caring" for the stakeholders. However, stakeholder management and CSP have their own focus. Where stakeholder management emphasizes the organization of the various stakeholder groups and their interests, CSP is predominantly concerned with issues.
Sustainable Development
The World Commission on Environment and Development proposed a generally accepted definition of sustainable development: "a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations" (Brundtland, 1987, p. 46) . Sustainable development implies at the macroeconomic level that over time, economies can possess relatively stable natural resources and manufactured capital (Reinhardt, 2000) . The necessity of theorizing on sustainable development emerged from the alarming developments in the natural environment and from inequalities of welfare distribution within and between societies.
The term sustainable development embraces three major concerns: the alleviation of social inequalities, the ability to sustain current welfare, and the protection of the natural environment (Aguirre, 2002) . Yet another concern is the need for poverty reduction. Many people still have a miserable standard of living today, being deprived from food, water, shelter, or elementary medication. Efforts toward advancing sustainable development should be directed, in the first place, toward the considerable improvement of the situation of these people (Sen, Brundtland, & Johnson, 2002) . Overall, sustainable development is concerned with everyone's quality of life.
The work of Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause (1995) embraces the core notions of various conceptions of sustainable development. Scholars in sustainability advocate "human development . . . in an inclusive, connected, equitable, prudent, and secure manner" (Gladwin et al., 1995, p. 878) . With inclusiveness, the authors talk about the attention to development over time and space, referring to both environmental and human systems. Connectivity denotes ecological, social, and economic interdependence so as to remind us that achieving a particular (e.g., economic) goal automatically implies interfering with the other two goals (social and ecological). As to equity, Gladwin et al. (1995) explain that sustainable development urges fair distribution of resources across species (human or nonhuman), across generations (future or current), and across societies (within a generation). Prudence depicts the notion of political, technological, and scientific (a) care with respect to the caring capacity of our planet and (b) prevention with respect to irreversibilities of destructive developments. Actually, prudence represents the means to an end-security. Security implies that our planet is a safe and healthy place to live in. Yet these five principles-inclusiveness, connectivity, equity, prudence, and security-suggest the complexity of sustainability advancements.
In other words, "sustainable development cannot be achieved by one nation alone" (Holliday, Schmidheiny, & Watts, 2002, p.13) . Global cooperation is necessary to achieve sustainable development (Sen et al., 2002) , where countries should favor the collective interest.
Overall, sustainable development as a principle refers to operations of economic systems, that is, the focus falls on the national or supranational level (i.e., the global level of analysis). As such, sustainable development has a predominantly normative central thesis, prescribing how societies ought to develop. In its endeavor of a secure quality of life for everyone now and in the future, sustainable development represents a highly idealistic conception of life. The reason for this statement is the complex and unrealistic matter of collaboration at all possible levels, that is, individual, organizational, national, and supranational. Except for its high level of complexity, such a collaboration requires the kind of action where one is ready to sacrifice (at least partially) one's own wealth and use one's own power for the common good, which is unfortunately not a common practice. Compared to other conceptions in B&S, the sustainability principle has much in common with the CSR 1 principles and with the principles of business ethics. Although there is a clear difference in the level of analysis-global versus organizational or individual-all three principles proclaim an ideal type of conduct.
Corporate Sustainability
Corporate sustainability can be considered a translation of the macroeconomic principle of sustainable development to the corporate level of analysis. Organizations are deemed to have significant impact on alarming social and environmental developments (Starik & Marcus, 2000) . Consequently, companies are expected to significantly advance the sustainability of their actions. In other words, organizations need to be concerned with "social and human welfare while reducing the ecological footprint and ensuring the effective achievement of organizational objectives" (Sharma, 2002, p. 13 ; italics added).
We will further explain these three aspects of corporate sustainabilityenvironmental, social, and economic, also known as the triple bottom line of businesses (Elkington, 1997) . Organizations can reduce their ecological footprint by continuously improving their waste and energy management and by engaging in partnerships to analyze the life-cycle impact of their products (product stewardship) (Bansal, 2002) . The social aspect of corporate sustainability can be approached from a stakeholder perspective (Bansal, 2002) , that is, the interaction between companies and their constituents. Primary stakeholders influence the sustainability strategies of organizations directly, whereas secondary stakeholders are influential through indirect ways (Sharma & Hendriques, 2003) . As to the economic aspect, that is, the achievement of organizational success, an important nuance appears in the sustainability debate. Gladwin et al. (1995) propose to replace the notion of "indefinite organizational growth" with "indefinite organizational development" (p. 897). In this context, sustainable competitive advantage does not mean the generation of maximum economic rents in a particular period but, rather, ensuring the longevity of rent generation.
Corporate sustainability denotes the contribution of business to the sustainable development of societies. A significant advancement of sustainability by companies requires business-to-business partnerships, for example, with customers, suppliers, and even competitors. Besides, a significant progress in sustainable development is unlikely without the effort of governments and consumers (citizens) (Bansal, 2002; Holliday et al., 2002) . Organizations will find a challenge in the establishment of sustainable relationships with all their stakeholders (Starik & Rands, 1995) .
Corporate sustainability clearly integrates normative notions (with respect to organizational concerns with social and human welfare), descriptive notions (with respect to the ecological footprint), and instrumental notions (with respect to the achievement of organizational objectives). Overall, corporate sustainability contains idealistic features. Despite its strategic orientation (cf. Bansal, 2005; Porter & Linde, 1995; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) , corporate sustainability prescribes, in a fashion similar to CSP, business solutions to matters spanning beyond companies and rarely acknowledges the positive corporate influences on social and ecological welfare. Other similarities between corporate sustainability and CSP (and thus, respectively, to stakeholder management and to corporate citizenship) are the level of analysis and the challenge to the exclusive, ego-centered economic bottom line. They differ, however, in that corporate sustainability is strongly associated with the natural environment, whereas CSP is mainly concerned with the social performance of companies. Another distinction is the strategic orientation of the sustainability literature, demonstrating that corporate performance with a concern for people and the natural environment is consistent with building and sustaining competitive advantage (e.g., Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Lovins & Lovins, 2001; Porter & Linde, 1995) . But how can the presence of strategic approaches to corporate sustainability and the absence of those in CSP be explained?
We propose two explanations for this observation. One possible answer is that corporate sustainability is concerned with well-defined issuesenvironmental preservation and human welfare-and that brings the degree of complexity to a "researchable" level. This allows a focus on a particular research problem and its rigorous description. Second, the environmental issue has been brought to the organizational agendas through regulation (Majumdar & Marcus, 2001) or other external institutional influences (Hoffman, 1999) . In this context, organizations were in a sense "forced" to develop environmental strategies, which then have become an interesting subject of research. In the case of CSP, public policy regulation would have to be quite ambitious.
Discussion
The level of idealism in B&S literature is approached in this article by a discussion of the normative validity, descriptive accuracy, and instrumental power of the mainstream themes in this literature. Our discussion is summarized in Table 1 , which also reviews the origin of these themes, their level of analysis, and comparability to the other themes in the field.
As a result of our study, we can more critically reflect on the accusations that B&S literature is idealistic, that is, advocates corporate conduct according to perfect standards even if this is unrealistic. These accusations must be corrected in first place. It is simply incorrect to call idealistic the many instrumental propositions of, for example, CSR 2 , stakeholder management, and corporate sustainability. There is also no idealism in the descriptive branch of business ethics, where the morality of individual or corporate conduct is evaluated in its specific context. In addition, it is inappropriate to accuse of idealism those who advise businesses to actively manage social issues that have reached momentum and take place on the political or the managerial agenda. However, these corrections are derived after a comprehensive study of the B&S literature. But the multitude of concepts in this literature is confusing not only to practitioners but also to researchers, especially those who are just starting out in this field. Accusations of idealism may be a result of such confusion, that is, an intellectual fatigue while attempting to grasp all these concepts. Yet the concern that B&S is idealistic would never appeal if it had not been based on substantive arguments.
The arguments that fuel concerns about idealism in the contemporary B&S field are based on at least three elements: (a) its (rhetorical) criticism of the way in which companies operate, (b) the predominance of normative notions in its mainstream concepts, and (c) the underdeveloped instrumental ideas. The first element refers to the sharp criticism of corporate scandals, environmental disasters caused by companies, and immoral practices in contested industries (e.g., tobacco, alcohol, chemicals) . Such criticism appears rhetorical, and the use of metaphoric language, which is the case in corporate citizenship and stakeholder management, indicates it. All this leaves the impression that B&S scholars believe in a perfect world, which leads us to the second element of idealism. We refer here to the predominantly normative orientation of B&S concepts. The managerial attention to social issues and secondary stakeholders is advocated in this branch of the literature predominantly from a moral perspective. In other words, such attention is proclaimed as morally correct and legitimate. Hence, the result of this is the third element of B&S idealism, that is, the underdeveloped instrumental ideas in our field (Salzman, Ionescu-Somers, & Steger, 2005) . As we have discussed already, the instrumental arguments for business contribution to social and environmental issues are in most cases poorly articulated (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) , are insufficient to develop a plausible strategic logic, and cannot count on empirical support. We should realize that prescribing what companies should (not) do from a moral perspective is insufficient to improve the social performance of businesses. An idealistic stance can only provide companies with a view of how their performance might be organized. Perspectives on the obligations of businesses, like any other opinion, are determined by the interest of a stakeholder in a particular issue (Dutton & Webster, 1988) , by previous stakeholder experience (Daft & Weick, 1984; Simon, 1982) , and by the quality of information (Stiglitz, 2000) that shapes stakeholders' perception of what companies should do. In other words, practitioners may not necessarily agree with the tenets in scientific literature, as they may read the normative postulation on business practice from their managerial perspective (i.e., their experience, knowledge, information, and interests). Such possible lack of agreement suggests the existence of "expectational gaps of what should be" (Wartick & Mahon, 1994, p. 28) between normative B&S theorists and managers.
Therefore, it is unlikely that B&S scholars will persuade companies to promote social good and prevent social harm through idealistic rhetoric. To lower the idealism in our field, future B&S writing needs to consider less rhetorical language (cf. Roberts, 2006) . Future research also needs to consider the collaboration of various groups, including companies, toward the solution of social and environmental problems instead of arguing that companies have legitimate obligations and enough resources to solve these problems. In addition, future research is needed to comprehensively develop the instrumental power of B&S theories. This can be reached when we know under what conditions noble business actions can lead companies to competitive advantage (Burke & Logsdon, 1996; Rowley & Berman, 2000) . We can gain knowledge of these conditions after having rigorous insights on the positive and the negative effects of CSP on the competitiveness of firms. Yet the research on the former is still underdeveloped. And although the negative effects of CSP have been reported recently (Heugens & Dentchev, in press; Kotler & Lee, 2005) , they are at this stage of theoretical development a taboo for many B&S scholars. We are convinced, however, that idealism in B&S will prevail if we do not break this taboo and gain knowledge of these negative effects.
In conclusion, the reputation of B&S that compares our field as an ideology can be changed by stepping away from its current stance, prescribing "what companies should do," toward advising practitioners how to integrate the norm of social responsibility in their business models. We stress the importance that B&S scholars are aware of two problems in one continuum, arguing that life should be what it is (naturalist fallacy) versus arguing that life should be ideal even if this is not realistic (idealistic fallacy). In attempting to suggest an organization that integrates-at least in part-the norms of social responsibility, scholars should always answer the question whether such theoretical advancement can be realistically implemented in practice. 2. We mention and will elaborate on the sustainability tradition because it considers the simultaneous integration of the principles of economic welfare, social equity, and environmental preservation in organizational performance (Sharma, 2002) .
3. The word themes is meant to incorporate the various level of conceptualization that these terms offer.
4. The normative, descriptive, and instrumental purposes were comprehensively described for the stakeholder theory in Donaldson and Preston (1995) , to which Jones and Wicks (1999) have offered an alternative explanation (Treviño & Weaver, 1999) . Swanson (1999) proposed a value-based approach to resolving the normative-descriptive dilemma in corporate social performance (CSP). Wood (2000) regarded the three approaches as promising and described the accomplishments across themes, that is, for the overall business and society field. Most recently, Rodriguez, Richart, and Sanchez (2002) classified a limited number of articles devoted to corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsiveness, CSP, stakeholder management, and efficiency (referring to Friedman, 1962 Friedman, , 1970 with respect to the three theoretical approaches (normative, descriptive, instrumental).
5. Normative validity implies that certain statements are correct and require no further justification. It should not be confused with the term validity as used in research methodology. The latter refers to whether a measurement procedure is properly measuring what it claims to measure.
6. Yet our interpretation of the central thesis does not necessary imply that there might be no other valuable interpretations. Just as it similarly does not imply that if the central thesis of a particular topic is being judged, for example, normative, there are no descriptive or instrumental approaches to that topic. Dentchev / Idealistic 23 7. Swanson (1995, p. 45) describes negative duties as restraining the action that can harm others, whereas positive duties are seen as supporting the commitment to help others.
8. Clarkson (1995) states, A primary stakeholder group is one without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as going concern. . . . Secondary stakeholder groups are defined as those who influence or affect, or are affected by, the corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions with the corporation and are not essential for its survival. (pp. 106-107) This is a static distinction of the primary and secondary stakeholder, which does not consider the ways secondary stakeholders can become influential.
9. Because we note that CSP and corporate citizenship are synonymous, stakeholder management and corporate citizenship are synonymous too.
